We investigate the Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel (AVWC) with non-causal side information at the jammer for the case that there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper and under the condition that strong degradedness holds. Non-causal side information means that codewords are known at an active adversary before they are transmitted. By considering the maximum error criterion, we allow also messages to be known at the jammer before the corresponding codeword is transmitted. A single letter formula for the common randomness secrecy capacity is derived.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secrecy in an adversarial environment is an essential criterion in modern communication systems. It was Wyner, [1] , who considered secure communications over noisy channels and introduced the Wiretap Channel (WTC). Later, his work was extended by [2] to the Broadcast channel with confidential messages. Since wireless communications is vulnerable to eavesdropping due its broadcasting nature, the motivation of the previous two works to combat a passive eavesdropper by cleverly taking the physical properties of the transmit medium into account and to come up with a coding strategy which can guarantee information theoretic security and reliable communication at the same time is apparent. But those works had in common that the adversary was assumed to be passive.
By introducing channel states, active adversaries who can arbitrarily modify the channel state can be modeled by the Arbitrarily Varying Channel (AVC). For the AVC, different code concepts have been introduced in [3] and extensively discussed in [4] for different error criteria. It could be shown that the random code capacity of an AVC under the average error criterion equals its random code capacity under the maximum error criterion. Even though [4] provided a condition for the deterministic code capacity under the maximum error criterion to be positive, the question about the exact formula is open until today. In [5] , [6] , the authors investigate non-causal side information at a jammer for an AVC, and an arbitrarily varying quantum channel,respectively. The authors prove that the random code capacities for average and maximum error in both scenarios that the jammer only knows the channel input or the jammer knows both the channel input and the corresponding message are equal. In [7] , Sarwate generalized the situation of "nosy noise", [5] , where the channel input is perfectly known at the jammer, to an "myopic adversaries", where a jammer has a noise version of the channel input as side information. He used a relation between deterministic list codes under the maximum error criterion and random codes.
If secrecy requirements are combined with active attacks on communication systems, the Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel is the correct channel model. In [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , the AVWC was studied subject to the average error criterion under various constraints. The authors of [13] derive a general multi-letter formula for the common randomness assisted code secrecy capacity and a single-letter formula for the strongly degraded case under the average error criterion.
In this work, we consider the AVWC with non-causal side information at the jammer and provide the random code secrecy capacity under the maximum error criterion for the case that there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper and under the This work is funded by the german research foundation (DFG) within the project Play Scate (DFG JO 801/21-1).
1 n N (a, b|x n , y n ) − W (b|a) 1 n N (a|x n ) < δ, N (a, b|x n , y n ) = 0 if W (b|a) = 0.
See also [14] for the method of types and the definitions of typicality. The paper is organized as follows. We present the system model in Section II and state our main result in Section III. Finally, we provide an example in Section IV and close with a discussion, Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a common randomness assisted AVWC as depicted in Fig. (1) . In contrast to previous work, here an external jammer has non-causal access to the channel input X n u . Note that this system model has been considered without secrecy constraints by Sarwate [5] , using a connection between deterministic list codes and random codes. Furthermore, this system model also has been considered without secrecy constraints for the classical-quantum case by Boche et al. [6] . In the latter case, the authors used random coding arguments instead of list codes, as done in [5] . Remark 1. We explicitly exclude the possibility of a cooperating jammer and eavesdropper. Otherwise, the jammer would be able to encode channel inputs x n into state sequences s n such that the eavesdropper gets a version of the x n , such that the leakage does not vanish asymptotically, rendering the common randomness secrecy capacity zero. Definition 1. We describe an Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel by (X , S, W, V, Y, Z). The family of channels to the legitimate receiver is described by W = {(W s : X → Y) : s ∈ S}. The family of channels to the illegitimate receiver is described by V = {(V s : X → Z) : s ∈ S}. The channel is memoryless in the sense that the probability of receiving the sequences y n = (y 1 , y 2 , ..., y n ) and z n = (z 1 , z 2 , ..., z n ), when sending x n = (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) is
By (W, V), we mean the AVWC defined above.
Definition 2. An (n, J n , U n , p U ) common randomness assisted wiretap code K ran n consists of a family of stochastic encoders E u : J → X n and mutually disjoint decoding sets D j,u : Y n → J with message set J := {1, ..., J n }, where u ∈ U n has a distribution p U ∈ P(U). The maximum error probability averaged over all possible randomly chosen deterministic wiretap codebooks e(K ran n ) can be written as
We define the channel p X n ,U|J : J → X n × U as
Let F : X n → S n describe the family of all possible mappings from X n to S n . If the jammer has non-causal knowledge about the channel input x n , then the maximum error probability has to be adapted tô e(K ran n ) := max j∈Jn x n ∈X n p X n |J (x n |j) max s n =f (x n ) f ∈F u∈Un p U|X n ,J (u|x n , j)W n (D c j,u |x n , s n ).
Remark 2. In contrast to the standard AVWC, here in the case of non-causal knowledge at the jammer the maximization of s n is done within each term of the sum. Further, this maximum error criterion corresponds to the case where the jammer additionally knows the message.
Definition 3. A nonnegative number R S is called an achievable common randomness assisted secrecy rate for the AVWC if there exists a sequence (K ran n ) ∞ n=1 of (n, J n , U n , p U ) common randomness assisted codes, such that the following requirements are fulfilled lim inf
lim n→∞ e(K ran n ) = 0,
A nonnegative number R S is called an achievable common randomness assisted secrecy rate for the AVWC with non-causal knowledge of the channel input at the jammer if there exists a sequence (K ran n ) ∞ n=1 of (n, J n , U n , p U ) common randomness assisted codes, such that the following requirements are fulfilled lim inf
lim
where V n f = V n (z n |x n , f (x n )). The supremum of all achievable common randomness assisted secrecy rates for the AVWC is called the common randomness assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC (W, V) and is denoted by C ran S (W, V), when the jammer has no knowledge about the channel input, and C ran S (W, V) with non-causal knowledge of the channel input at the jammer.
The secrecy capacity C ran S is lower bounded by C ran S . Note that the eavesdropper has access to the common randomness. Hence, the randomness cannot be used as a key to ensure secure communication between Alice and Bob. We explicitly do not bound the cardinality of the common randomness. For a discussion about the capacities without secrecy requirements, see [6] .
Remark 3. Note that we can indeed consider the maximization over θ n ∈ P(S n |X n ) instead of considering the maximization over all deterministic mappings F : X n → S n . For the proof see Appendix C.
Definition 4 (Convex closure and row convex closure [4] ). Let p ∈ P(S) andp ∈ P(S|X ) be probability measures. The convex closure and the row convex closure of the AVC are defined as
The convex closure and the row convex closure are given respectively as
Definition 5 (Best Channel to the Eavesdropper). Let Z n θ be the output of the channel V θ (Z n |X n ). If there exists a θ * ∈ P(S n |X n ) such that for all other θ ∈ P(S n |X n ) the Markov chain
holds, then we say that there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper and all channels V θ (Z n |X n ) are degraded with respect to the channel V θ * (Z n |X n ).
Definition 6 (Strongly Degraded). An Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel with Channel input non-causally known at the Jammer (AVWC-CJ) (or correspondingly an AVC,or an AVWC) is strongly degraded (with independent states, see [8] ) if the following Markov chain holds
Lemma 1 ([15, Corollary 2]). Let (x n , s n ) ∈ T n PXS , with fixed but arbitrary T n PXS , and X ′n be uniformly distributed on T n P . Then
Proof. See Appendix D.
III. CAPACITY FORMULAS FOR THE AVWCWITH NON-CAUSAL SIDE INFORMATION AT THE JAMMER
is strongly degraded and if there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper and if the jammer has non-causal side information of the channel input x n ∈ X n (and the corresponding messages), then the common randomness assisted code secrecy capacity is given by
= max PX min θ∈P(S|X )
= max
This secrecy capacity depends on the row convex closures W and V.
Proof. In the following, we will only give a proof sketch, due to space limitation. For the complete proof see Appendix E and Appendix F. a) Codebook Generation: Let χ := {X n u,j,l : j ∈ J n , l ∈ L n , u ∈ U n }. Here j ∈ J n = {1, 2, . . . , J n } and l ∈ L n = {1, 2, . . . , L n } correspond to the secure and confusing messages, respectively. We start by generating a deterministic wiretap code for each u ∈ U n . Since we use random coding arguments, each codebook at this point is a random variable. Partition the set of typical sequences T n p,δ into disjoint subsets C (j,l) of size |C (j,l) | = |T n p,δ | |Jn||Ln| . For each codebook K n u (χ), we draw J n · L n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) codewords X n u,j,l uniformly from the subsets C (j,l) . We have J n ·L n = exp {nR}. b) Decoding regions: Let D ′ ujl (χ) be given as
Then, we can define the decoding sets D ujl (χ), being random sets, as follows.
c) Adaptation of the error criterion: We will modify the error criterion and require that both the secret message J and the confusing message L should be successfully decoded at Bob. Hence, we havê
The proof can be summarized as follows.
d) Properties for Reliability: We use random coding arguments as in [6] opposed to the approach in [5] , and generate random sets of deterministic wiretap codebooks. Note that we have to take into account that the jammer possesses non-causal knowledge about the channel input (and we allow knowledge of the messages, as we will see in [long version]), which results in a different error probability than the usual one. Furthermore, we have to make sure, that each codeword belongs to sufficiently many codebooks. If the jammer is able to allocate a codeword to only one codebook, we have the situation of deterministic codes. Then we would have to consider the maximum error probability for that scenario, which is still an open problem. To avoid this situation, the uncertainty for the jammer, even though he knows the channel input x n , has to be sufficiently high. This can be achieved if the codewords belong to sufficiently many codebooks. We show that the probability of decoding a wrong message vanishes asymptotically, as well. Therefore, we define the set of typical sequences at the legitimate receiver as decoding regions, and can upper bound the error probability by using properties of typical sequences. Note that here in contrast to the classical Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC), we have three error terms. The two traditional ones, there is no typical sequence or there is a wrong typical sequence, and the probability that a given codeword exceeds for a specific codebook a certain error bound. Since we apply random codes, we do actually not know which codebook realizations lead to a good error performance. Otherwise, we could use specific codes and end up in the deterministic wiretap code case, which is still an open problem. In the latter scenario, where the jammer knows the channel input non-causally, we would have to consider the maximum error probability for deterministic codes. But we know that the error probability vanishes averaged over a set of codebooks. Since the codewords occur in multiple codebooks, we have to take care of the situation that the codewords perform well in some codebooks, but not so well in others. Therefore, we define the following sets.
For the error probability we can overall concludê
e) Properties for Security: We have to show that the leakage to the eavesdropper vanishes asymptotically. Therefore, we make use of the fact that there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper and the fact that the probability that the implied probability distributions are not in an ǫ region around the expected typical ones can be upper bounded using Chernoff bounds. Then we can make use of [14, Lemma 2.7 ]. If the variation distance of the channel output probability distribution and the conditional channel output probability distribution can be upper bounded, then the leakage can be upper bounded as well. To upper bound the variation distance, the triangle inequality will be used in combination with properties of typical sequences. Note that the existence of a best channel to the eavesdropper is crucial at this point to reduce the jammer's possible choices of jamming sequence from double exponentially many to only exponentially many. For details for the probabilities that the aforementioned properties hold, see Appendix E. f) Existence of Codes Fulfilling both Requirements: Last, we show that the probability of obtaining codes for which both the decoding error probability and the leakage vanish asymptotically approaches one. g) Converse: For the converse, we modify the standard converse proof for the WTC. It is easy to see that this channel AVWC fulfills the strongly degraded property, and is not symmetrizable. The secrecy capacity under the average error criterion for this AVWC without side information at the jammer, [13, Theorem 6, Corollary 1] is given by
in contrast to the formula in equation (12) . It is easy to see that
The secrecy capacity of this AVWC can be calculated to C ran S,av (W, V) ≈ 0.3 bits per channel use, p X (0) = p X (2) = 0.5, p X (1) = 0, α = 0.5, β ≈ 1. In contrast to that, one can easily see that the channels
correspond to the worst and the best channels to Bob and Eve, respectively, if the channel input is non-causally known at the jammer. In this case, the secrecy capacity for the AVWC can be calculated to C ran S (W, V) ≈ 0.26 bits per channel use, p X (0) = p X (1) = 0.5, p X (2) = 0. The second input symbol is used for the case with non-causal side information at the jammer instead of the third one as for the AVWC without side information.
V. DISCUSSION
In this work, we derived a single letter formula for the random code secrecy capacity under the maximum error criterion for an active attacker with non-causal side information of the codewords, provided there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper, and that the channel is strongly degraded with respect to the main channel. The maximum error criterion was considered, which implies that the messages might also be known at the jammer. We applied and extended methods of [6] and [13] . We have shown that the derived secrecy capacity depends on the row convex closures of the sets of channels to Bob and Eve. It is also clear that the secrecy capacity subject to the average error criterion for the case that the attacker does not possess non-causal side information is lower bounded by the one, where the attacker has non-causal side information, subject to the maximum error criterion..
A general multi letter formula for the case that the channel to the eavesdropper is not strongly degraded with respect to the main channel, will be the subject of our future work.
APPENDIX A DETERMINISTIC WIRETAP-CODE Definition 7 (Deterministic Wiretap-Code). An (n, J n ) deterministic wiretap-code K n consists of a stochastic encoder E : J → P(X n ) and mutually disjoint decoding sets D j : Y n → J , with message set J := {1, ..., J n }. We denote EW n s n : J → P(Y n ) by EW n s n (y n |j) =
x n ∈X n E(x n |j)W n (y n |x n , s n ).
The maximum error e(K n ) for the AVWC can be expressed as e(K n ) := max s n ∈S n max j∈Jn x n ∈X n E(x n |j)W n (D c j |x n , s n )
If the jammer has non-causal knowledge about the channel input x n , then the maximum error probability has to be expressed asê
for an arbitrary family of functions F : X n → S n .
APPENDIX B VARIATION DISTANCE AND PROPERTIES OF TYPICAL SETS
Definition 8 (Variation Distance). The variation distance of two distributions P 1 , P 2 on X is defined as
In the achievability part of the proof for Theorem 1, we will make use of the following lemmas and corollary , for which a similar version for classical quantum channels can be found in [15, Lemma 1, Corollary 2]. Next, we summarize some known facts from [14] .
Lemma 3 (Properties of typical sets I). Let x n ∈ T n p,δ . Then for any W :
Lemma 4 (Properties of typical sets II). Now, let δ > 0. Then for every p ∈ P(X ), W : X → P(Y) and x n ∈ X n p n (T n p,δ ) ≥ 1 − (n + 1) |X | exp{−ncδ 2 }, W n (T n W,δ (x n )|x n ) ≥ 1 − (n + 1) |X ||Y| exp{−ncδ 2 } with c = 1 2 ln 2 . Furthermore, there exist an n o , depending on |X |, |Y| and δ, such that for all n > n 0 for each p ∈ P(X ) and W : X → P(Y)
Lemma 5 (Properties of typical sets III). The cardinality of the set of all possible types of length n is upper bounded.
|P n 0 (S)| ≤ (n + 1) |S| .
Lemma 6 (Properties of typical sets IV). Assume, the distributions p, p ∈ P(X ) and the two matrices W, W : X → P(Y) are given. For any positive integer n and sufficiently small δ > 0,
for all x n ∈ T n p,δ holds, with some f 3 (δ) > 0 and lim δ→0 f 3 (δ) = 0. Furthermore, there exist an n 0 and a ν, depending on |X |, |Y| and δ, such that for all n > n 0 , ν > 0 (pW ) n (T n W ,δ (x n )) ≤ exp{−n(I(p; W ) − ν))}.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF REMARK 3
We consider both, the error probability and the information leakage. Let for the maximization over s n given x n the maximum error probability and the information leakage respectively be given as
Using the same (n, J n ) deterministic wiretap code fulfilling the above criteria now considering the maximization over θ n ∈ P(S n |X n ) we can express the maximum error probability of transmitting one codeword as
and hence we have
For the leakage we can show that
V n θ n =
x n ∈X n θ n (s|x n )V (z n |x n , s n ),
s n ∈S n θ n (s n |x n )V (z n |x n , s n ).
The mutual information is convex in V (z n |x n , s n ) for fixed input distribution. Hence, taking linear combinations of V (z n |x n , s n ) does not increase the leakage term. Furthermore, each value of I(p Jn ; E u V n s n ) can also be achieved by I(p Jn ; E u V n θ n ), since the deterministic mappings F are a subset of the stochastic mappings P(S n |X n ), F ⊂ P(S n |X n ) and hence the equality is established.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF OF LEMMA 1
Proof of Lemma 1. Since the proof is given for the quantum case in [15] , we adopt it to the classical case.
Let (X n , S n ) be uniformly distributed on T n PXS and let X ′n be uniformly distributed on T n P . We have
x ′n ∈T n P p X n (x ′n ) exp {nξ} y n ∈( ŝ n ∈S n T n W,δ (x ′n ,ŝ n )) (x n ,s n )∈X n ×S n p n XS (x n , s n )W (y n |x n , s n ) W ŝ n ∈S n T n W,δ (x ′n ,ŝ n ) x n , s n as y n ∈( ŝ n ∈S n T n W,δ (x ′n ,ŝ n )) W (y n |x n , s n ). (d) follows because of the memorylessness. (e) follows by rearranging the sum and the product. 
where π is an arbitrary permutation. This is true, since the probability only depends on the joint type of (x ′n , x n , s n ).
Therefore,
x ′n ∈T n P p X n (x ′n )W ŝ n ∈S n T n W,δ (x ′n ,ŝ n ) x n , s n is constant and we can rewrite the expectation to
for all (x n , s n ) ∈ T n PXS , with fixed but arbitrary T n PXS .
APPENDIX E ACHIEVABILITY
a) Codebook properties for reliability: As already mentioned, we have to make sure, that every codeword occurs in multiple codebooks. By generating the codebooks K n u (χ), u ∈ U n as above, there are |T n p,δ | J n · L n = exp {n(H(X) − R + ǫ 1 (n))} nonoverlapping codebooks in the worst case, where R corresponds to the code rate. To ensure the occurrence of each codeword in k codebooks (on average), we should use an amount of common randomness which corresponds to
We follow and combine the ideas of [9] , [16] and [15] . First, let us fix a pair (j, l) ∈ J n × L n , a sequence x n ∈ C (j,l) and the state sequence s n ∈ S n . We have to show that if the sequence x n is a codeword (occurring in multiple codebooks), then the state sequence is bad only for few codebooks, such that averaged over all codebooks, the error probability still vanishes. This has to hold for all pairs (j, l), sequences x n ∈ C (j,l) and s n ∈ S n .
Therefore, we define the following sets.
U(j, l, x n , χ) := u : X n u,j,l = x n , x n ∈ K n u (χ) (19) U 0 (j, l, x n , s n , χ) := u : X n u,j,l = x n , x n ∈ K n u (χ), and W n (D c ujl (χ)|x n , s n ) > λ (20)
We can define the random variable R as
It is easy to see that P r{R(u, j, l, x n , χ) = 1} = 1 |C (j,l) | = Jn·Ln |T n p,δ | = exp {−n(H(X) − R + ǫ 1 (n))}. By the Chernoff bound we obtain P r {|U(j, l, x n , χ)| ≤ (1 − ǫ 2 )|U n |P r{R(u, j, l, x n , χ) = 1}} = P r u∈Un R(u, j, l, x n , χ) ≤ (1 − ǫ 2 )|U n | J n · L n |T n p,δ | ≤ exp e − 3ǫ 2 2 |U n |J n · L n 8|T n p,δ | Next, we will upper bound the probability that |U 0 (j, l, x n , s n , χ)| is greater than a certain value. Therefore, we define the event E 1 (j, l, x n , s n , u, λ, χ) as there exists a x n ∈ C (j,l) with X n u,j,l = x n and W n (D c ujl (χ)|x n , s n ) > λ.
Furthermore we define the random variableR(E 1 (j, l, x n , s n , u, λ, χ)) as
Then again by the Chernoff bound we obtain P r |U 0 (j, l, x n , s n , χ)| ≥ (1 + ǫ 2 )|U n | · P r R (E 1 (j, l, x n , s n , u, λ, χ)) = 1 = P r u∈UnR (E 1 (j, l, x n , s n , u, λ, χ)) ≥ (1 + ǫ 2 )|U n | · P r R (E 1 (j, l, x n , s n , u, λ, χ)) = 1 ≤ P r u∈UnR (E 1 (j, l, x n , s n , u, λ, χ)) ≥ (1 + ǫ 2 )|U n | · P r{R(u, j, l, x n , χ) = 1}P r W n (D c ujl (χ)|x n , s n ) > λ|R(u, j, l, x n , χ) = 1
We consider the case that the error bound is not met for a fixed u ∈ U n . By the Markov inequality Lemma 10 and by Lemma 1 we have P r W n (D c ujl (χ)|x n , s n ) > λ|R(u, j, l, x n , χ) = 1 ≤
Hence for all |U n | fulfilling
the probabilities that codewords do not occur in an at least 1 − ǫ 2 times the expected number of codebooks and that codewords occur in more than 1 + ǫ 2 times the expected number of codebooks for which the error bound is not met, vanish super exponentially fast. The probabilities that the above events hold for all pairs (j, l) ∈ J n × L n , x n ∈ C (j,l) and s n ∈ S n can be expressed by P r    (j,l)∈Jn×Ln x n ∈C (j,l) s n ∈S n |U 0 (j, l, x n , s n , χ)| ≤ (1 + ǫ 2 )|U n | · P r R (E 1 (x n , s n , u, λ, χ)) = 1
b) Codebook realization: Now, let K ran n be a codebook realization fulfilling the aforementioned properties, with decoding sets D ′ ujl as
and decoding sets D ujl , being as follows.
c) Adaptation of the error criterion: We will modify the error criterion and require that both the secret message J and the confusing message L should be successfully decoded at Bob. Hence, we havê e(K ran n ) = max
≤ max j∈Jn max l∈Ln max x n ∈X n max s n ∈S n u∈Un p U|X,J,L (u|x n , j, l)W n (D c ujl |x n , s n )
:=ê(K ran n ) Our motivation to do so is to reduce the size of the space, over which should be optimized. The family F = {f : X n → S n } consists of |F | = |S n | |X n | elements, hence grows doubly exponentially with n. By considering the maximum with respect to x n , it is sufficient to consider the state sequence s n maximizing the error probability. Hence, we can reduce the space size over which should be optimized to X n × S n , which grows only exponentially in n. x n ∈X n max s n ∈S n u∈U0(j,l,x n ,s n ) p U|X,J,L (u|x n , j, l)W n (D c x n ,u |x n , s n )
The last inequality holds with probability going super exponentially fast to 1. We choose
and have shown an exponential vanishing error probability. e) Codebook properties for secure communication: As mentioned in the outline of the proof, we will try to use connections between the mutual information and the variation distance. Notice that in contrast to the error analysis we do not average over the codebook ensemble when considering the leakage. In other words, the leakage has to vanish for all u ∈ U n . It is sufficient to consider the best channel to the eavesdropper since fulfilling the secrecy requirement for the best channel to the eavesdropper implies that the secrecy requirement is fulfilled for all other channels to the eavesdropper, as well. Now, for a fixed u ∈ U n , we have
Now, if we can show that ||V θ * (·) −V θ * (·|j)|| V ≤ ǫ 3 ≤ 1 2 then we can make use of [14, Lemma 2.7 ] and obtain
We follow [13] to prove that the secrecy requirement is fulfilled. We have
Ω(Z n ) will be defined in this section. We will concentrate on the first term, since
Let (x n , s n ) have type p 0 (x n , s n ) ∈ P n 0 (X S), with p 0 (x n , s n ) = p n (x)θ * ,n (s|x). We define the set
where f 2 (δ) is the one in Lemma 3. This is the set of typical z n ∈ T Z θ * ,2|X |δ fulfilling the second property (for z n ∈ T V θ * ,δ (x n )) in Lemma 3. Remember that if x n ∈ T n p,δ and z n ∈ T V θ * ,δ (x n ), then z n ∈ T Z θ * ,2|X |δ . We setΩ
where we take the expectation over all x n ∈ T n p,δ , and define the set
Remember that
where we have |T Z θ * ,2|X |δ | and ǫ n by Lemmas 3 and 4, respectively.
Remark 4. The reason we set the lower bound in (27) will be clear when proving Lemma 7. Essentially, this term allows us to upper bound the probability that the event in (31) is not true, when using a Chernoff-bound.
We set
By definition, Ω(z n ) ≥ ǫ n exp{−n(H(Z θ * ) + f 1 (δ))}, for all z n ∈ ε 2 , else Ω(z n ) = 0. Note, that when summing up over all z n ∈ ε 2 we get
As in [13] we obtain a modification of V n θ * as Q θ * (x n , z n ) := V n θ * (z n |x n )1 ε1(x n ) (z n )1 ε2 (z n ),
and can define the event
Lemma 7. For τ a > 0, the probability that ι 1 (j, z n ) is not fulfilled can be upper bounded as
Proof. We will make use of a Chernoff-Hoeffding bound, Lemma 8.
We can plug in the bounds for Q θ * (X jl , z n ) according to ǫ 1 (x n ), and Ω(z n ) according to ǫ 2 , Q θ * (X jl , z n ) ≤ exp{−n(H(Z θ * |X) − f 2 (δ))}, Ω(z n ) ≥ ǫ n exp{−n(H(Z θ * ) + f 1 (δ))}, and obtain for the exponent
If we choose L n to be
then the probability that ι 1 (j, z n ) is not fulfilled vanishes doubly exponentially fast.
We define the event ι 0 as the event that ι 1 (j, z n ) holds for all j ∈ J n , z n ∈ Z n , and u ∈ U n ι 0 := j∈Jn z n ∈Z n u∈Un
We can bound the probability of ι 0 from below as
Since J n , |Z| n , and |U n | grow only exponentially fast in n, but P r {ι c 1 (j, z n )} vanishes doubly exponentially fast in n, the probability that ι 0 holds, approaches one. f) Leakage analysis: Let K ran n be a realization of the random random code fulfilling the required properties for guaranteeing secrecy. We can now bound the first term in equation (24) for any j ∈ J as
In the following, we bound the right hand side of (33), and the terms in (34), (35), individually. The right hand side of (33) can be bounded by the result of Lemma 7 to
For (34), we obtain
V n θ * (z n |x jl )1 ε1(x jl ) (z n )1 ε2 (z n )
For (35), we obtain Therefore, in total we obtain ||V θ * (Z n ) −V θ * (Z n |j)|| V ≤ 10ǫ n + 2 exp{−nc ′ δ 2 } I(p Jn ; E u V n θ * ) ≤ n 10ǫ n + 2 exp{−nc ′ δ 2 } log (|Z|) − 10ǫ n + 2 exp{−nc ′ δ 2 } log 10ǫ n + 2 exp{−nc ′ δ 2 } , which vanishes as n goes to infinity. g) Existence of codes fulfilling both the error and the secrecy requirement: After having proved that there exist codes fulfilling the error requirement and the secrecy requirement separately, we show that there exist codes fulfilling the aforementioned criteria simultaneously.
Therefore, we define the following event. where both, P r{ι c 0 } and P r{ι c } vanish super exponentially fast. Hence, there exist codes fulfilling the aforementioned criteria simultaneously. Therefore, the following common randomness assisted secrecy rate is achievable 
APPENDIX F CONVERSE
For the converse, we introduce a time sharing parameter and use the fact that we can here express the difference of two mutual information terms as one single conditional mutual information term.
Lemma 8 (Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds). Let X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n be i. There exist also other versions of the Chernoff bounds.
Lemma 9 (Chernoff bounds). Let X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n be i.i.d. RVs with values in {0, 1}, with P r{X i = 1} = p. For all α ∈ (0, 1) and p 0 < p < p 1 , the following bounds hold
Furthermore, we give a reminder on Markov's inequality.
Lemma 10 (Markov's Inequality). Let X be a RV with mean E[X] = µ and let a be a positive number. Then P r{X ≥ a} ≤ µ a .
